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Over the last few years we have observed a prominent flourishing of empirical studies 
on the determinants of new business creation and its effect on the economy. The present 
study focuses on an important determinant of entrepreneurship: the quality of 
institutions. This paper is an empirical exploratory work that has the objective of 
uncovering the relationships between entrepreneurial dynamics and different variables 
related to the quality of government institutions, with an emphasis on developing 
countries. The study is based on the panel data of 60 countries that participated in the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) project. The results indicate that the quality of 
institutions is a relevant factor for the distribution and type of entrepreneurial activities. 
Some implications for public policy are discussed.  
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1 Introduction 
Over the last few years we have observed a growing body of research investigating the 
relationship between entrepreneurship1 and basic regional and national economic 
variables such as aggregate income and competitiveness (e.g., Blanchflower 2000; 
Carree et al. 2002; Carree and Thurik 2003; Acs and Armington 2004; van Stel, Carree 
and Thurik 2005; Wennekers et al. 2005). Some empirical contributions based on the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) research initiative show that variations in 
economic growth rates can be explained by differing rates of entrepreneurship 
(Reynolds, Hay and Camp 1999; Zacharakis, Bygrave and Shepherd 2000). In this sense 
the creation of new ventures2 may contribute to the economic performance of countries 
and regions because entrepreneurial activities introduce innovation, create competition 
and enhance rivalry (Audretsch and Keilbach 2004; Wong, Ho and Autio 2005). 
Nevertheless, the impact of these entrepreneurial efforts on economic growth differs not 
only between countries at similar levels of development (Carree et al. 2002, 2007), but 
also between countries at different stages of development (Wennekers et al. 2005; Acs 
and Amorós 2008) as well as among regions within a single country (Acs and 
Armington 2004; Belso-Martínez 2005; Hall and Sobel 2008).  
In this context, entrepreneurship as the engine of economic growth is related to a 
combination of other determinants such as education levels, business climate, and legal 
and political conditions (Grilo and Thurik 2005; Hwang and Powell 2005; van Stel, 
Carree and Thurik 2005; Grilo and Irigoyen 2006; Bowen and De Clercq 2008). Some 
of these ‘macro level’ factors3 can explain the entrepreneurship rates but also the type 
of entrepreneurial activities between countries and regions (Bowen and De Clercq 
2008). A number of researchers have developed frameworks to explain some of the 
macro (and micro) determinants of entrepreneurship activities or entrepreneurial process 
(Reynolds, Hay and Camp 1999; Reynolds et al. 2005; Verheul et al. 2002; Wennekers 
and Thurik 1999; Sobel 2008). Precisely, these frameworks consider institutional factors 
to be the determinants of entrepreneurial dynamics. 
 
                                                 
1   In the literature it is possible to find several definitions for entrepreneurship both in static and in 
dynamic contexts. Some definitions include the creation of new business, pursuing new opportunities, 
or even the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction. Without a loss of generality, we refer to the 
definition of entrepreneurship used by the GEM project: ‘adults in the process of setting up a business 
they will (partly) and or currently be owning and managing an operating young business’. 
2  Recent studies confirm that during the last two decades, the development of new technologies, and the 
emergence of new business models have shifted from large corporations to small and new ventures 
(Acs and Audretsch 1988; Jorgenson 2001; Audretsch and Thurik 2001; Thurow 2003).  
3   Micro-level research, in terms of formally modelling an agent’s labour choice, has been undertaken by 
several economists, including Lucas (1978); Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979); Iyigun and Owen (1998); 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1998). These studies suggest that a micro-foundational approach does 
indeed provide a useful theoretical framework in terms of examining the expected evolution of 
entrepreneurship. Consider, for example, the model presented by Lucas (1978). The central 
proposition of his model is that given the distribution of agents according to managerial talent, an 
increase in real wages tends to increase the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship. This, in turn, affects 
the allocation of labour across different activities. In terms of Lucas’ analysis, the size distribution of 
firms tends to change in favour of larger firms as an economy grows wealthier.  2 
The present study focuses on a crucial determinant of entrepreneurship in developing 
(and developed) countries: the quality of institutions.4  This work is an empirical 
exploratory work with the objective of identifying the relationship between the rates and 
types of entrepreneurial dynamics to different variables relating to the quality of 
institutions. Specifically, we explore the question: What kinds of institutions are related 
to the phenomenon of entrepreneurship in developing countries?  
In a sense, this work proposes taking a ‘step back’ on the problem of entrepreneurship 
and public policy by explicitly considering a more general perspective of the influence 
of government institutional quality. Governance impacts on economic outcomes, 
including entrepreneurship, basically through the government’s general role to provide 
—or not to provide—institutions that underpin an effective rule of law (Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón 1999; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2008; Hellman et al. 
2000). Why do we focus on the developing countries? There is a general consensus that 
low- and middle-income countries have a relatively low degree of institutional quality in 
comparison with the more developed nations. Developing and emerging economies 
have specific environments, and for a developing-country perspective, some of the 
assumptions generally applied to the developed countries (North America, Europe or 
Japan) need a ‘re-focus’ (Bruton, Ahlstrom and Obloj 2008; West, Bamford, and 
Marsden 2008; Acs and Amorós 2008). In this sense, this paper attempts, by contrasting 
the developed versus the developing countries, to examine whether the quality of 
institutions affects the entrepreneurial dynamics. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the paper presents a 
general framework on the concept of the quality of institutions and describes how it 
affects entrepreneurship. Section 3 details the methodology and variables. Section 4 
presents the results of the empirical application, with some discussion on the 
relationship between entrepreneurship and quality of institutions. Finally section 5 
concludes. 
2  Institutions, institutional quality and entrepreneurship 
In economics, the research on entrepreneurship has important theoretical models. The 
early contributions by Joseph A. Schumpeter (1934, 1950), Frank H. Knight (1971), and 
Israel Kirzner (1973) represent not only examples of ground-breaking research in 
economic theory but at the same time, constitute the essential foundations for many of 
these theories of entrepreneurship. Developments in economics in the last few decades 
have also led to very interesting new formal models of entrepreneurship (Audretsch and 
Thurik 2001; Audretsch 2007). Reynolds, Hay and Camp (1999) introduce a general 
model, which argues that established business activity at the national level varies with 
the number of variables denominated to ‘general national framework conditions’, while 
entrepreneurial activity varies with the ‘entrepreneurial framework conditions’. These 
conditions are related to the social, cultural and political context of a country, but the 
entrepreneurial framework conditions include the specific policy and governmental 
                                                 
4  I follow North’s (1990) definition of institutions: ‘Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that 
structure political, economic and social interaction’.  3 
programmes that enhance the entrepreneurship dynamics of a country.5 It is, however, 
remarkable that as Boettke and Coyne (2006) note, ‘Only recently have economists 
begun to pay attention to the role of institutions and how they influence entrepreneurial 
behaviour’.  
Government institutions can clearly influence the rate of entrepreneurship. Public 
policies can basically determine the entrepreneurial dynamics of a country or region by 
introducing specific entrepreneurship policies as well as by creating a general 
institutional structure conducive to entrepreneurship (Sobel, Clark and Lee 2007). There 
is a flourishing body of literature examining the role of specific policies on 
entrepreneurship (Audretsch, Grilo and Thurik 2007). This theoretical and empirical 
research reviews the characteristics of different entrepreneurship policies and evaluates 
their implementation (Stevenson and Lundström 2005, 2007; Hoffmann 2007). Other 
researchers also evaluate the impact of these policies but include extended criticisms 
about their effectiveness—or ineffectiveness (Li 2002; Storey 2005; Parker 2007). It is 
important to remark, however, that this body of literature is mainly based on developed-
country experiences. At this point it is important to note that the emphasis of this work 
on institutional quality is related to the preceding approaches regarding specific 
entrepreneurship policies. These policies ‘emerge’ from the general governmental 
environment, and the interaction with this environment is a central determinant of 
entrepreneurship.6 
As stated before, the second type of government influence related to institutional 
structures that determine the ‘rules of the game’ for entrepreneurship is less studied, and 
is again focused mainly on the more developed economies (Sobel, Clark and Lee 2007). 
The efficient allocation of resources in an economy (in this case, the allocation of 
entrepreneurial talent) is expected to be quite different under different institutional 
structures. Institutions, as the basic set of constraints within which economic agents 
interact, will have a crucial effect on an economy. Different institutional environments, 
ceteris paribus, (i.e., differences in the quality of institutions) have different effects on 
the level and/or type of entrepreneurship. An analogy may be useful here. Consider 
economic interaction as a game; it becomes quite evident that the rules of the game can 
shape, in a crucial sense, the outcome of the interaction (Buchanan 1991). Alternative 
structures of the rules can then be expected to lead to different outcomes.  
But how does the quality of institutions in reality affect entrepreneurial activities and 
the decision of whether or not to become an entrepreneur? Following the basic tenets of 
neoclassical economic theory, entrepreneurship in this context must commence from an 
individualistic perspective. It is the economic agent who decides whether or not to 
undertake entrepreneurial activities or any other type of wage-earning activities. It is the 
individual’s rationale that determines the allocation of inputs across different activities 
when he or she is faced with a given budgetary constraint or a given environmental 
                                                 
5   For complete measurements and methodology of the GEM model and entrepreneurial framework 
conditions, see Reynolds et al. (2005). For recent changes in GEM, see Bosma et al. (2008). Levie and 
Autio (2008) make an extensive empirical test of the GEM model using a review of Leibenstein’s 
theories of entrepreneurship and economic development (1968, 1978, 1995) and link these theories 
with the entrepreneurial framework conditions. 
6   On these issues, see the discussion in Storey (2005). 4 
opportunity. Then, a model of labour choice can explain entrepreneurship.7 Risk 
aversion also plays a role in the decision to be entrepreneur. For instance, Iyigun and 
Owen (1998) model a situation in which the accumulation of entrepreneurial and other 
professional skills cannot be undertaken simultaneously (although they both constitute 
elements of an aggregate production function). To the extent that entrepreneurship is a 
risky activity, agents are less likely to be entrepreneurs when good, safer alternatives are 
available. The model by Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) differs from the above in terms 
of the attitudes of agents towards risk, where under conditions of general equilibrium 
with agents maximizing their expected utility, it is noted that agents who are less risk-
averse will tend to be entrepreneurs.  
Note that the quality of institutions critically matters in this context. For instance, it is 
well-known that if ‘prices’ do not convey accurate information as to the relative 
scarcities of different ‘products’ (Hayek 1945), then the allocation of resources will be 
misguided. It is evident that this analysis can be extended to the problem of the 
allocation of entrepreneurial effort (or, more generally, the allocation of labour). At the 
same time, risk perceptions and assessments can also be affected by institutional quality. 
An economy where the institutional framework does not safeguard an agent’s economic 
freedom tend to be riskier in an objective sense,8 affecting once again the manner in 
which the economy resolves its resource allocation problem. These cases represent 
particularly illustrative instances in which institutional variables dramatically influence 
the determinants of entrepreneurship. 
To the extent that economic relations are carried out in a context where transactions 
costs are important, the significance of these latter variables are also relevant in the 
decision of whether to engage in entrepreneurial activities. As the costs of determining 
and enforcing contracts, and of obtaining information on different market conditions, 
are influenced by the quality of institutions (North 1990), this is another mechanism 
through which institutions matter for entrepreneurship. 
The fact that institutional quality has important effects on the allocation of 
entrepreneurial talent in a given economy is highlighted by Baumol (1990). The work of 
Baumol is one of the first to argue that the differences in entrepreneurship are the result 
of varying institutional elements across countries or regions. His contribution about the 
concept of productive, unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship links not only the 
rates (or level) of entrepreneurial activities to a specific context, but also relates the 
allocation of entrepreneurial efforts to institutional variables. Baumol’s conjectures 
explain that countries (or regions) with better institutions have more productive 
entrepreneurship and less unproductive (or destructive) entrepreneurship. The starting 
point of his work is the attractive egalitarian world where entrepreneurial talents are 
uniformly distributed across the population, but where such talent is only conducive to 
economic growth, in terms of it being harnessed productively under certain institutional 
conditions. When the incentive structure of an economy leads agents to unproductive 
(rent-seeking) activities, we can expect that agents will follow suit. For example, in a 
world where the largest ‘prizes’ are awarded to those that undertake unproductive 
                                                 
7   For different models along these lines, see Lucas (1978) and Lazear (2005). 
8  This greater risk can be captured by examining the assessments of risk-rating agencies, as well as 
from the point of view of modern portfolio financial theory in terms of the higher returns demanded 
by the investors in these economies. 5 
activities, the level of productive entrepreneurship will necessarily be smaller. Boettke 
and Coyne (2003) have observed that entrepreneurship manifests itself differently 
across alternative institutional regimes and that only some of these expressions are 
consistent with economic development.  
In concluding this section, it is important to explain that some of the arguments 
reviewed here have been the subject of empirical research, which tends to corroborate 
that institutions (or, more accurately, institutional quality) have an important effect on 
economic outcomes.9 But only a few studies have inquired about the link between 
institutional quality and entrepreneurship (Sobel 2008). Thus, it should be stated again 
quite emphatically that institutional quality is an element that should be present in any 
model and theory purposing to explain entrepreneurship. In this sense, the general 
research question is: if institutional variables are different depending on the country’s 
degree of development, does this situation affect the rates and types of entrepreneurship 
in a different manner? With an empirical approach, I explore the relationship between 
some entrepreneurial rates utilizing the GEM data and certain measures of the quality of 
institutions, using the World Bank approach described in the next section.  
3 Empirical  model 
3.1  Data sources 
The well-known GEM project represents a fundamental underpinning to provide 
harmonized, internationally comparable data to evaluate entrepreneurship activity 
across different countries. Also, GEM is useful for studying the effects and the 
determinants of entrepreneurship. It is generally recognized in the GEM reports that 
institutional quality plays a key role as a determinant of entrepreneurship (Reynolds et 
al. 2005). By the end of 2007, 60 different countries had participated in GEM, 32 of 
which are considered to be developing and emerging countries (see Appendix for 
complete list and classification). GEM’s database contains various entrepreneurial 
indicators that have been constructed on the basis of a survey known as the ‘adult 
population survey’. This survey helps GEM to estimate the percentage of the adult 
population (generally people between 18–64 years old) who are actively involved in 
starting a new venture. This indicator is called the early-stage entrepreneurial activity 
index (also known as the total entrepreneurship activity index or TEA).10 The GEM 
methodology disaggregates early-stage entrepreneurial activity according to two main 
entrepreneur motives. The first category is the opportunity-based entrepreneurs (OPP) 
who undertake action to create a new venture pursuing perceived business opportunities. 
There are the ‘Schumpeterian entrepreneurs’ who have a ‘pull motive’, such as the 
desire for independence, or the purpose of increasing his personal or family income, 
challenge, status and recognition. The second category is the necessity-based 
                                                 
9   For seminal research on this question see, for example, the papers by Keefer and Knack (1995); 
Knack and Keefer (1997) and Barro (1991). 
10 This index is based on the life-cycle of the entrepreneurial process which is divided into two periods: 
the first covers nascent entrepreneurs who have undertaken some action to create a new business in 
the past year but have not paid any salaries or wages in the last three months. The second category 
includes owners/managers of businesses that have paid wages and salaries for over three months, but 
less than 42 months.  6 
entrepreneurs (NECs), who are ‘pushed’ into entrepreneurship because ‘being an 
entrepreneur’ is the only option for subsistence. Although many studies recognize that 
the majority of entrepreneurial activity is the result of the search for business 
opportunities (Kolvereid 1996; Feldman and Bolino 2000; Carter et al. 2003; Hessels, 
van Gelderen and Thurik 2008; Bosma et al. 2008), there is a relatively high prevalence 
of NEC entrepreneurs starting new endeavours in many low- and middle-income 
countries. These motive-based entrepreneur categories make a good proxy for Baumol’s 
concepts of productive-unproductive entrepreneurship. This is discussed in the next 
section. 
Data on the approximation of the countries’ institutions and institutional quality were 
derived from the World Bank’s ‘Project on Governance’.11 The motivation for this 
project lies, to use the same expression employed by the Bank’s initiative, in the 
recognition that ‘governance matters’ (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón 1999; 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2008). The way in which governance is expected to 
make a difference on economic outcomes can be captured by the World Bank’s 
definition of governance: ‘We define governance as the traditions and institutions by 
which authority in a country is exercised for the common good’.
12 A product of this 
project is the worldwide governance indicators (WGI). WGI has developed aggregate 
and individual governance indicators for 212 countries and territories covering the 
period 1996–2007. The WGI covers six dimensions of governance:  
–  Voice and accountability,  
–  Political stability and absence of violence,  
–  Government effectiveness,  
–  Regulatory quality,  
–  Rule of law, and  
–  Control of corruption.  
The relation between these variables and entrepreneurial decisionmaking is quite 
straightforward. Respect for the basic principles of a free-market economy represents a 
basic condition for entrepreneurial activity.13 To use a Schumpeterian term, 
entrepreneurship presupposes that an agent will be able to ‘combine’ different resources 
in different ways, which in turn implies that he has the right to do so without being 
confiscated or facing other violations. Detailed definitions of these variables and their 
measures are given in section 3.3.  
                                                 
11 For the complete World Bank Institute Initiative of Governance and Anti-Corruption Programme, see 
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance. 
12 It is interesting to note that this definition is quite similar to North’s (1990) standard definition of 
institutions. See note 5.  
13 On these issues, see also the analysis by Bjørnskov and Foss (2008), which suggests that many 
components of the economic freedom index that one would expect to be related to entrepreneurship do 
not seem to show any sort of relationship. 7 
3.2 Dependent  variables 
Dependent variables are from the GEM databases covering the 8-year period, 2001-07, 
and 60 countries. The first dependent variable is the rate of OPP, defined as the 
percentage of the adult population who are involved in early-stage entrepreneurial 
activity and who claim to be driven by the recognition of a business opportunity. These 
business opportunities can be a good proxy for Baumol’s productive entrepreneurial 
activities.14 By the year 2007, the GEM methodology had been improved and 
calculation of OPP rates revised. According to the new definition, 
… those who chose recognition of an opportunity were asked whether 
the main driver behind pursuing this opportunity was (i) to increase their 
own income, (ii) to be independent or (iii) to maintain their income. The 
latter category was not considered as a genuine opportunity for the 
measures (Bosma et al. 2008: 62).  
The new OPP category includes an additional variable, ‘improved opportunity’ 
(IMPROPP), which is a measure of the proportion of opportunity-driven undertakings in 
early-stage entrepreneurial activity, with theoretical values ranging from 0 to 100. This 
ratio can provide an indication ‘of the anatomy’ of opportunity entrepreneurship (Levie 
and Autio 2008), rather than population-level rates (or volume). So, the OPP measure 
for 2007 is not totally comparable to previous years, and will thus be used as control for 
2007 in the panel models for testing for significant differences between periods. A 
specific model using IMPROPP only for the 2007 year and their correspondent 
independent variables is tested.  
The third dependent variable is the rate of necessity-based entrepreneurs (NEC). Again, 
it is the percentage of the country’s adult population involved in entrepreneurship 
‘because they cannot find a suitable role in the world of work; creating a new business 
is their best available option’ (Reynolds et al. 2005: 217). This measure is relevant for 
understanding entrepreneurship activities in developing countries. The GEM reports 
establish that low-income countries have a high rate of entrepreneurial activity because 
a large part of the population has been unable to find other sources of employment. This 
type of entrepreneurship corresponds to Baumol’s unproductive entrepreneurial 
activities because in the developing countries, many of these are in the ‘shadow’ or 
informal economy. Furthermore, many of these entrepreneurs abandon their efforts once 
they have the opportunity to become employees. Based on the modified 2007 OPP, it is 
assumed that NECs for specific countries have increased during the year, so 2007 will 
again be used as a control. 
                                                 
14 Even though the recognition of an opportunity is one of the ‘central factors’ of the entrepreneurship 
process (Timmons and Spinelli 2007), GEM’s OPP measure can incorporate any type of 
entrepreneurial activity, including self-employment, and this can involve low-growth or no-growth 
entrepreneurship. In the GEM data, nearly 50 per cent of all start-up attempts do not expect to create 
any jobs within five years (Autio 2007). Within Baumol’s productive-entrepreneurship-activity 
approach, GEM’s OPP measure probably does not ‘fit’ at all. This discussion will be taken up in the 
results section. The GEM methodology computes the high-expectation TEA (HEA) index, which is 
the percentage of adult-aged population involved in TEA who expect to create 20 or more jobs within 
five years.
. GEM’s 2007 Executive Report and 2007 Global Report on High-Growth Entrepreneurship 
suggest that early-stage entrepreneurial activity in the middle- and low-income countries may be 
dominated more by low-growth entrepreneurial initiatives. Unfortunately, this measure is not 
available for all the years and countries analysed here. 8 
3.3 Independent  variables 
I utilize the six WGI variables defined in exact terms according to Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi (2008: 7-8): 
i)  Voice and accountability (VA), measuring perceptions of the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
and a free media. 
ii)  Political stability and absence of violence (PS), measuring perceptions 
of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown 
by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated 
violence and terrorism. 
iii)  Government effectiveness (GE), measuring perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and credibility of the government’s commitment to 
such policies. 
iv)  Regulatory quality (RQ), measuring perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations 
that permit and promote private sector development. 
v)  Rule of law (RL), measuring perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
vi)  Control of corruption (CC), measuring perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites 
and private interests. 
Clearly, some of these variables are related more directly with entrepreneurship 
activities (or total economy activities) but all variables are considered for the initial 
analysis. These indicators are measured following a normal distribution with a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of one in each period. According to WGI, these variables 
virtually have scores between -2.5 and 2.5, with the higher scores corresponding to 
better outcomes. In order to test the different specifications including logarithmic, the 
scores are transformed to 0-5 scale. The WGI indicators are available biannually from 
1996, and annually for the six-year period 2002-07. Thus, for this reason the 2001 
measures are not available.15 
                                                 
15 Different missing-values procedures are inputted to calculate the 2001 rates, but the models with these 
values do not produce a better statistical fit (R
2). Therefore the model is calculated with only the 
available years.  9 
3.4  Control variables 
In addition to independent variables, the first control variable is the gross domestic 
product per capita (GDP pc) for the period 2002-07. Per capita income growth rate is a 
good proxy for measuring economic growth and is one of main sources for qualifying 
economic development (Wennekers et al. 2005). These variables are adjusted by the 
purchasing power parity per US dollars, GDP per capita (PPP). The data are taken from 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database published September 2007. To resolve the 
potential collinearity problem (some institutional variables are highly correlated with 
GDP), the models are retested, using a control variable for the country’s degree of 
economic welfare: HINCOME with the value 1 for GEM’s high-income countries (see 
the Appendix). In order to control for the effect of the recalculated OPP, dummy 
variable Y2007 with value 1 is used for the countries participating in 2007. A 


















































OPP  1                     
IMPROPP  -0.166 1                   
NEC  0.683** -0.488** 1                 
VA  -0.322** 0.622** -0.611** 1               
PS  -0.408** 0.722** -0.681** 0.719** 1             
GE  -0.337** 0.782** -0.670** 0.782** 0.816** 1           
RQ  -0.328** 0.721** -0.653** 0.787** 0.800** 0.950** 1         
RL  -0.329** 0.773** -0.683** 0.803** 0.837** 0.973** 0.947** 1       
CC  -0.290** 0.817** -0.638** 0.788** 0.815** 0.971** 0.936** 0.974** 1     
GDP pc  -0.331** 0.766** -0.687** 0.705** 0.724** 0.868** 0.833** 0.870** 0.863** 1   
HINCOME  -0.316** 0.778** -0.617** 0.655** 0.661** 0.811** 0.779** 0.821** 0.806** 0.880**1 
Note: ** significant at 0.01% level. 
3.5 Methodology 
The sections on the literature framework and variable descriptions note that the 
developing countries have relatively high rates of necessity-based entrepreneurial 
dynamics, while most developed nations have relatively high rates of productive 
entrepreneurs. Mindful of the general research proposition, in countries under ceteris 
paribus conditions,16 the relationship between the institutional-quality variables is 
positive for the opportunity entrepreneurial dynamics rates, and negative for necessity 
entrepreneurship. In order to examine these relationships, we use a series of regressions 
following this general model: 
Eit= f(WGIit, , Xit)  
                                                 
16    Obviously other different economic, demographic, social and institutional factors exist, which 
influence entrepreneurial activity. See Wennekers et al. (2005: 298). 10 
where:  
E is entrepreneurial dynamics: OPP, IMPROPP or NEC; 
WGIs represent each of the World Bank’s government variables; 
X is the control variables: GDP per capita (PPP) or HINCOME and Y2007; 
i is the country index and t is the time period. 
Models are estimated by pooling the cross-section of countries with the time-series data 
on each country for the period 2002-07. Linear, logarithmic, inverse relations are 
verified, as is the quadratic specification, using a general-to-specific modelling 
procedure to test the better statistical fit.17 In addition, a different intercept coefficient is 
specified for each country (fixed and random effects). The relationship between OPP 
and NEC entrepreneurial activities and the quality of institutions variables is tested. For 
2007, only a simple OLS linear model is used. 
4 Results 
The panel models on opportunity and necessity are performed using a random-effect 
specification.18 The first results confirm the potential problems of multicollinearity 
between some WGI variables that were advised in the correlation matrix. To solve this 
problem, VA, PS, and CC are dropped from the panel models,19 but for each variable a 
useful graphical analysis is considered. The first results from the regression models 
indicate that the R
2 values and the likelihood ratio tests are higher for the quadratic 
specification on opportunity-based entrepreneurial activities. Logarithmic specification 
is better on NECs, while linear specification is more suitable for improved opportunity.  
4.1  Opportunity entrepreneurial activity 
Linear, logarithmic, inverse and quadratic specifications using the OPP variable are 
tested. Graphical analyses given in Figure 1 show the relationship between OPP and 
each of the six WGI variables. Quadratic specification (U-shape) has a better statistical 
fit (adjusted R
2 values) and superior statistical specification. 
The results are shown in Table 2. In the GDP model, ‘government effectiveness’, GE 
and GE squared are significant (negative and positive, respectively); GDP and GDP 
squared are significant (negative and positive, respectively). The HINCOME model has 
                                                 
17 A series of Akaike tests and Schwarz tests, such as selection criteria for different models, are 
performed.  
18 Hausman tests are used to prove the better specifications for each model. The null hypotheses for 
these tests are that there are no systematic differences between the fixed- and random-effects 
specifications. High p-values on OPP and NEC models would confirm this and support the use of 
random-effects specification. 
19  VA and PS, by definition, are ‘less related’ to economic activities. CC is highly correlated with RL. 
Nevertheless a model using all variables (not shown here) was performed with non-significant 
variations with respect to the restricted model. Also variance inflation factor (VIF) test was 
performed, which corroborates the multicollinearity problem.  11 
the same results as the GE variables and HINCOME is significant and negative. This 
last result is consistent with the observation by Carree et al. (2007) who find that rich 
countries face a decreasing level of total entrepreneurship activity. Compared with the 
whole period 2001-07, the control for the year 2007 is not significant, so significant 
variations of the 2007 OPP measures can be discarded. Even though the models are 
statistically significant and in accordance with previous research (Wennekers et al. 
2005; Acs and Amorós 2008; Amorós and Cristi 2008), the observed relationships 
(U-shaped relationship) are not plausible explanations for the allocation of productive 
entrepreneurship with respect to the quality of institutions. The graphical analysis shows 
that countries with lower rates in their government variables (generally the low- and 
medium-income countries) exhibit a high degree of ‘opportunity’ entrepreneurial 
activities. Thus, even though GEM’s opportunity rates for developing countries are 
high, they do not necessarily represent ‘high-quality’ (productive) entrepreneurship 
activities (Bosma et al. 2008).  
Figure 1 
GEM opportunity-based entrepreneurship versus WGI quality of government institutions, 2002-07 
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Table 2 
Opportunity-based entrepreneurship models 
  GDP model  HINCOME model 
GE -12.709**  -14.107** 
GE (squared)  1.680**  1.835** 
RL -4.591  -4.775 
RL (squared)  0.659  0.709 
RQ 6.755  6.768 
RQ (squared)  -0.878  -0.889 
GDP pc  -0.001**   
GDP pc (squared)  4.30E
-09*  
HINCOME   -1.633* 
Y2007 -0.001  -0.142 
Constant 27.707  28.360 
R
2 0.329  0.3840 
Wald chi
2   23.63***  21.43*** 
Observations 221  221 
Groups 60  60 
Note:  * Significant at 0.10% level; ** significant at 0.05% level; *** significant at 0.01% level. 
4.2 Improved  opportunity 
For this dependent variable two different series of WGI variables are tested. The results 
are shown in Table 3. 
Even though high bivariate correlations, and positive and significant one-to-one linear 
relationships for the six WGI variables can be observed for IMPROPP (Figure 2), some 
correlations disappear (or change to negative) in the OLS test with the introduction of 
GDP or HINCOME. For the GDP model using CC (control of corruption), PS (political 
stability) and RL (rule of law), the first two are positive and significant, RL is negative 
and significant20 and GDP is insignificant. In the HINCOME model, the results are  
 
Table 3 
Improved opportunity-based entrepreneurship 2007 models 
  GDP model 1  HINCOME model 1 GDP model 2  HINCOME model 2
CC 12.360**  11.480**     
PS 3.849*  4.770**     
RL -8.962*  -9.420**  1.526  0.864 
RQ     -1.186  -0.133 
Ge     6.610  6.020 
GDP per capita  0.000    0.000   
HINCOME   11.923***   11.639** 
Constant 42.661***  45.030*** 41.025*** 43.739*** 
   
R
2  0.690 0.77  0.590 0.660 
F  23.950*** 34.55***  16.250*** 21.160*** 
Observations  42 42 42 42 
Note:  * significant at 0.10% level; ** significant at 0.05% level; *** significant at 0.01% level. 
                                                 
20  This result is probably collinearity problem because CC is highly correlated with RL and this cross-
section model has a relatively low number of observations. 13 
similar but HINCOME is positive and significant. These last results are more plausible 
and confirm that those with high relative prevalence of improved opportunity-driven 
entrepreneurship are the high-income countries21 (Bosma et al. 2008). For the 
developing countries, the necessity-motivated entrepreneurs constitute an important 
share of the total entrepreneurial activity and, in many cases, the non-opportunity 
oriented (or necessity) unproductive entrepreneurial activities rates are above the OPP. 
 
Figure 2 
GEM improved opportunity-based entrepreneurship 
versus WGI quality of government institutions, 2007 
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21 Of the developing countries, only Chile and Uruguay have IMPROPP exceeding 50 per cent. 
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In this model similar to OPP, random effects and the same WGI variables are used. 
Linear, logarithmic and inverse relations are verified, as is the quadratic specification. 
Logarithmic model being once best adjusted. The results are shown in Table 4 and the 
graphical analysis in Figure 3. 
Table 4 
Necessity-based entrepreneurship models 
  GDP model  HINCOME model 
ln(GE)   -0.924  -2.969* 
ln(RL) -3.344**  -5.305 
ln(RQ) 2.817*  2.948 
ln(GDP) per capita   -2.171***   
HINCOME   -0.122 
Y2007   0.147  -0.289* 
CONSTANT   25.182***  8.672*** 
  
R
2 0.605  0.512 
Wald chi
2   97.99***  60.36*** 
Observations 221  221 
Groups 60  60 
Note:  Significant at 0.10 level. ** Significant at 0.05 level. *** Significant at 0.01 level. 
Figure 3 
GEM necessity-based entrepreneurship  
versus WGI quality of government institutions, 2002-07 
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Figure 3 (cont’d) 
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5 Discussion  and  conclusions 
5.1 Overall  findings 
In this paper I have conducted an exploratory analysis to examine the relationships 
between the quality of a country’s government institutions and the different types of 
entrepreneurship activities. Following Baumol’s (1990) propositions of the allocation of 
entrepreneurship activities, this study adds to the empirical evidence on the importance 
of institutional context in the level, motivations and quality of new venture creation 
across countries (Sobel, Clark and Lee 2007; Bowen and De Clercq 2008; Bjørnskov 
and Foss 2008), with an emphasis on the comparison between developed and 
developing economies. As Boettke and Coyne (2006) state, institutions can be 
understood as the formal and informal rules regulating human behaviour and the 
enforcement of these rules. Entrepreneurship is the outcome of human behaviour and 
the institutional environment—in this case, government institutions—will either 
enhance or not enhance—entrepreneurial activities.  
The findings presented in this paper suggest that differences in institutional quality help 
to explain differences in entrepreneurship across developed and developing countries. A 
country’s overall level of opportunistic entrepreneurial activities are not significantly 
affected by the WGI variables, and exhibit a non-plausible U-shaped curve.
22 Acs and 
Amorós (2008) note:  
U-shaped approach is useful in understanding the decline in self-
employment in developing countries both across countries and over time, 
but not useful in explaining entrepreneurship (broadly defined). Second, 
the U-shaped approach is not very useful in explaining the role of 
                                                 
22 Acs and Szerb (2008) and Ahmad and Hoffmann (2008), among others, are developing new global 
entrepreneurship indices. Complex Global Entrepreneurship Context Index (CDC) has three sub 
indexes that measure entrepreneurial activity, entrepreneurial strategy and entrepreneurial attitudes 
(Acs and Szerb 2008). The relationship between GDP growth and CDC index is more linear or mildly 
S-shaped, rather than U-shaped (Virgill 2008). Using fifty-three countries over the period 2005-06, 
with an emphasis on a developing region, Latin-America, only one country was in the bottom half of 
the index: Chile ranked 12th, Argentina 31st, Colombia 34th, Uruguay 35th, Venezuela 42nd, Mexico 
52nd and Brazil 53rd (Acs and Amorós 2008). 16 
developing countries in the efficiency-driven stage of development, 
either as they enter the efficiency-driven stage or leave the efficiency-
driven stage.  
Certainly the OPP measures for developing countries encompass many activities, which 
in comparison to those in the developed countries, do not constitute true opportunities or 
productive value-added activities.  
The positive relationships between improved opportunity-driven entrepreneurship 
activities utilized as a proxy for productive entrepreneurship and ‘control of corruption’, 
‘political stability’ and high-income countries indicate that real opportunity ventures can 
be allocated if the existing government institutions are of adequate quality. This has an 
important implication for entrepreneurs in the developing countries: the adoption of 
certain institutions has to precede productive entrepreneurial behaviour because these 
institutions, in this specific analysis, facilitate the right type of entrepreneurship 
(Boettke and Coyne 2006). 
Finally, results of NEC entrepreneurship activities have important implications for the 
developing countries. The negative relationship between ‘government effectiveness’, 
‘rule of law’ and GDP per capita confirm the influence of institutional quality on the 
allocation of entrepreneurship efforts. The results in general terms indicate that more 
economic development associated with better quality of institutions could reduce the 
prevalence rates of the unproductive entrepreneurial activities that are mainly motivated 
by necessity. For public policy, Leibenstein (1968: 83) suggests that attention be 
focused on: ‘… the gaps, obstructions, and impediments in the market network of the 
economy in question and on the gap-filling and input-completing capacities and 
responsiveness to different motivational states of the potential entrepreneurs in the 
population’. In this sense, government institutions should converge to enhance the 
efficiency of the market, as well as to provide a general environment that is open to 
motivated entrepreneurs (Levie and Autio 2008). For developing countries, this general 
environment is faced with the lack of regulations and rule of law (de Soto 2000), so 
many entrepreneurial efforts lead to large-scale, predominantly unproductive activities 
rather than the more desirable productive and real opportunity entrepreneurship. Thus 
institutional profiles in developing countries contrast with those of the high-income 
developed economies that benefit from a well-established regulatory base and wide 
support for entrepreneurship (Manolova, Eunni and Gyoshev 2008). 
5.2  Limitations and future research 
I hope that this study, based on a longitudinal analysis of 60 countries, provides some 
empirically relevant results related to entrepreneurship and the quality of institutions. 
Nevertheless, the exploratory nature of this research faces several limitations and the 
results are not conclusive. First, both GEM and WGI indicators are being improved 
continually. The IMPROPP variable is a good example of this. The GEM project has 
other variables that measure dimensions of high growth-oriented entrepreneurship, 
innovation-driven or degree of internationalization (Levie and Autio 2008; Hessels, van 
Gelderen and Thurik 2008). The use of alternative entrepreneurial measures like 
self-employment indicators or new indexes could be useful in developing this line of 
research. Other measures of the quality of institutions like the Index of Economic 
Freedom  (Heritage Foundation), Economic Freedom of the World (Fraser Institute), 
Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International) or other sources of 17 
government information like UNDP or the World Economic Forum could be 
complementary and help to define new models. These variables will possibly also help 
to resolve problems of collinearity by using different metrics. Using an approach based 
on a more specific regional focus or degree of development (for example, OECD 
countries, European Union countries, transition economies, Latin-America, etc.) can 
help to improve the estimations.  
Second, this paper is restricted to national-level data. An analysis at individual-level 
might show different patterns. Another level is the region; a regional approach faces 
differences in institutional quality and this affects on entrepreneurship activities (Hall 
and Sobel 2008; Sobel 2008).  
Finally, it is clear that any approach modelling entrepreneurship without explicitly 
considering institutional variables could be methodologically flawed. Moreover, the 
results of this paper find that both entrepreneurship and other determinants (for 
example, GDP) can be influenced asymmetrically by the quality of institutions. Thus, in 
future research more robust and nonlinear models need to be considered.  
5.3 Conclusions 
This paper analyses the relationship between different types of entrepreneurial dynamics 
and the quality of government institutions during the period 2002 to 2007. Even though 
these empirical results are not conclusive, as stated earlier, the study corroborates the 
significant and positive effects of the quality of institutions on opportunity (productive) 
entrepreneurial activities, and significant and negative effects on necessity 
(unproductive) entrepreneurial rates. Furthermore, high-income countries exhibit similar 
relationships, but low- and middle-income developing countries ‘move in the opposite 
direction’. Based on previous analyses (Acs and Amorós 2008; Amorós and Cristi 
2008), this research stresses that entrepreneurship activities, on their own, are only 
another ‘economy indicator’ if they are not accompanied with a positive environment 
that promotes the new venture creation. The national business environment is a decisive 
factor that determines the motivation of entrepreneurial projects and their quality. For 
this reason, the relatively high index of entrepreneurship rates in the developing 
countries as indicated with the GEM methodology, is characterized by a great number 
of necessity-motivated initiatives (which is an indicator of poverty rather than growth). 
This is in contrast to countries with greater economic development where a high 
proportion of entrepreneurial initiatives is triggered by opportunity that truly contributes 
to national economic growth.  
These results have important implications for public policy. The results suggest that for 
developing countries in general, the quality of institutions alone does not enhance or 
improve entrepreneurship. These countries need to work in order to achieve stable 
regulatory and macroeconomic conditions (Amorós and Cristi 2008). This implies 
continuing efforts for the reduction of unemployment and necessity-based 
entrepreneurship. But this kind of public policy, although indispensable, is insufficient. 
If developing countries do not consider the promotion of productive entrepreneurship as 
a main concern in their policy agenda (Wennekers et al. 2005), they will only reduce 
necessity-based entrepreneurship without achieving higher growth through opportunity-
based entrepreneurship. Such governmental decisions necessitate the creation of better 
national strategies to accelerate country growth and move more rapidly toward major 
innovation-based entrepreneurial activities (Acs and Amorós 2008). Developing 18 
countries must rationally organize their functions, and seek to remove unnecessary 
barriers and controls that hamper entrepreneurial activity. They need to protect and 
stimulate property rights, and introduce policies that support the creativity and 
efficiency of the private sector. With an adequate environment, including the quality of 
institutions, entrepreneurship can help to improve the economic and social conditions 
for developing economies.  
References 
Acs, Z. J., and C. Armington (2004). ‘Employment Growth and Entrepreneurial 
Activity in Cities’. Regional Studies, 38 (8): 911-28. 
Acs, Z. J., and D. B. Audretsch (1988). ‘Innovation in Large and Small Firms: An 
Empirical Analysis’. American Economic Review, 78 (4): 678-90.  
Acs, Z. J., and J. E. Amorós (2008). ‘Entrepreneurship and Competitiveness Dynamics 
in Latin America’. Small Business Economics, 31 (3): 305-22. 
Acs, Z. J., and L. Szerb (2008). ‘A Complex Global Entrepreneurship Context Index 
(CEC)’. Pecs: Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Pecs. Mimeo.  
Ahmad, N., and A. N. Hoffmann (2008). ‘A Framework for Addressing and Measuring 
Entrepreneurship’. OECD Statistics Working Paper, 2. Paris: OECD. Available at: 
www.ssrn.com/abstract=1090374. 
Amorós, J. E., and O. Cristi (2008). ‘Longitudinal Analysis of Entrepreneurship and 
Competitiveness Dynamics in Latin America’. International Entrepreneurship and 
Management Journal, 4 (4): 381-99. 
Audretsch, D. B. (2007). The Entrepreneurial Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Audretsch, D., and R. Thurik (2001). ‘What is New about the New Economy: Sources 
of Growth in the Managed and Entrepreneurial Economy’. Industrial and Corporate 
Change, 10 (1): 267-315. 
Audretsch, D., and M. Keilbach (2004). ‘Entrepreneurship and Regional Growth: An 
Evolutionary Interpretation’. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 14 (5): 605-16.  
Audretsch, D., I. Grilo, and R. Thurik (2007). The Handbook of Entrepreneurship 
Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Autio, E. (2007). ‘GEM’s Report 2007: Global Report on High-growth 
Entrepreneurship’. Produced in association with Mazars/London Business 
School/Babson College. 
Barro, R. J. (1991). ‘Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries’. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 106 (2): 407-43. 
Baumol, W. J. (1990). ‘Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive’. 
Journal of Political Economy, 98 (5): 893-921. 
Belso-Martínez, J. A. (2005). ‘Equilibrium Entrepreneurship Rate, Economic 
Development and Growth. Evidence from Spanish Regions’. Entrepreneurship and 
Regional Development, 17 (2): 145-61.  19 
Bjørnskov, C., and N. Foss (2008). ‘Economic Freedom and Entrepreneurial Activity: 
Some Cross-Country Evidence’. Public Choice, 134 (3-4): 307-28. 
Blanchflower, D. G. (2000). ‘Self-employment in OECD Countries’. Labor Economics, 
7: 471-505. 
Blanchflower, D. G., and A. J. Oswald (1998). ‘What Makes an Entrepreneur?’. Journal 
of Labor Economics, 16 (1): 26-60. 
Boettke, P. J., and C. J. Coyne (2003). ‘Entrepreneurship and Development: Cause or 
Consequence’. Advances in Austrian Economics, 6: 67-88. 
Boettke, P. J., and C. J. Coyne (2006). ‘Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Institutions’. In 
M. Minniti (ed.), Entrepreneurship: The Engine of Growth, Vol. 1. Westport, CT: 
Praeger Press, 119-34. 
Bosma, N., K. Jones, E. Autio, and J. Levie (2008). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
2007 Executive Report. London: Global Entrepreneurship Research Association. 
Bowen, H. P., and D. De Clercq (2008). ‘Institutional Context and the Allocation of 
Entrepreneurial Effort’. Journal of International Business Studies, 39: 747–67. 
Buchanan, J. M. (1991). ‘The Economy as a Constitutional Order’. In J. M. Buchanan 
(ed.), The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order. Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press. 
Bruton, G. D., D. Ahlstrom, and K. Obloj (2008). ‘Entrepreneurship in Emerging 
Economies: Where Are We Today and Where Should the Research Go in the 
Future’. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 32 (1): 1-14. 
Carree, M., and R. Thurik (2003). ‘The Impact of Entrepreneurship on Economic 
Growth’. In D. Audretsch and Z. J. Acs (eds), Handbook of Entrepreneurship 
Research. Dordrecht: Kluwer-Academic Publishers, 437-71. 
Carree, M., A. van Stel, R. Thurik, and S. Wennekers (2002). ‘Economic Development 
and Business Ownership: An Analysis Using Data of 23 OECD Countries in the 
Period 1976-1996’. Small Business Economics, 19 (3): 271-90.  
Carree, M., A. van Stel, R. Thurik, and S. Wennekers (2007). ‘The Relationship 
between Economic Development and Business Ownership Revisited’. 
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 19 (3): 281-91. 
Carter, N. M., W. B. Gartner, K. G. Shaver, and E. J. Gatewood (2003). ‘The Career 
Reasons of Nascent Entrepreneurs’. Journal of Business Venturing, 18 (1): 13-39. 
de Soto, H. (2000). The Mystery of Capital. New York: Basic Books. 
Feldman, D. C., and M. C. Bolino (2000). ‘Career Patterns of the Self-employed: Career 
Motivations and Career Outcomes’. Journal of Small Business Management, 38 (3): 
53-67. 
Grilo, I., and R. Thurik (2005). ‘Entrepreneurial Engagement Levels in the European 
Union’. International Journal of Entrepreneurship Education, 3 (2): 143-68. 
Grilo, I., and J. M. Irigoyen (2006). ‘Entrepreneurship in the EU: To Wish and not to 
be’. Small Business Economics, 26 (4): 305-18. 20 
Hall, J. C., and R. S. Sobel (2008). ‘Institutions, Entrepreneurship, and Regional 
Differences in Economic Growth’. Southern Journal of Entrepreneurship, 1 (1): 69-
96. 
Hayek, F. A. (1945). ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’. American Economic Review, 
35 (4): 519-30. 
Hellman, J. S., G. Jones, D. Kaufmann, and M. Schankerman (2000). ‘Measuring 
Governance, Corruption and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the 
Business Environment in Transition Economies’. WB Policy Research Working 
Paper 2444. Washington, DC: World Bank  
Hessels, J., M. van Gelderen, and R. Thurik (2008). ‘Entrepreneurial Aspirations, 
Motivations and their Drivers’. Small Business Economics, 31 (3): 323-39. 
Hoffmann, A. N. (2007). ‘A Rough Guide to Entrepreneurship Policy’. In D. Audretsch, 
I. Grilo and R. Thurik (eds), The Handbook of Entrepreneurship Policy. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 94-129. 
Hwang, H., and W. W. Powell (2005). ‘Institutions and Entrepreneurship’. In   
S. Alvarez, R. Agarwal and O. Sorenson (eds), Handbook of Entrepreneurship 
Research. Disciplinary Perspectives. New York: Springer, 201-32. 
Iyigun, M., and A. L. Owen (1998). ‘Risk, Entrepreneurship, and Human-Capital 
Accumulation’. American Economic Review, 88 (2): 454-57. 
Jorgenson, D. (2001). ‘Information Technology and the US Economy’. American 
Economic Review, 91: 1-32. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and P. Zoido-Lobatón (1999). ‘Governance Matters’. WB 
Policy Research Working Paper 2196. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2008). ‘Governance Matters VII: 
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2007’. WB Policy Research 
Working Paper 4654. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Keefer, P., and S. Knack (1995). ‘Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-
Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures’. Economics and Politics, 7 
(3): 207-27. 
Kihlstrom, R., and J. J. Laffont (1979). ‘A General Equilibrium Entrepreneurial Theory 
of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion’. Journal of Political Economy, 87 (4): 
719-48. 
Kirzner, I. M. (1973). Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Knack, S., and P. Keefer (1997). ‘Why Don’t Poor Countries Catch-up? A Cross-
National Test of an Institutional Explanation’. Economic Inquiry, 35 (3): 590-602. 
Knight, F. H. (1971) Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 
Kolvereid, L. (1996). ‘Organizational Employment versus Self-Employment: Reasons 
for Career Choice Intentions’. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 20 (3): 23-31. 
Lazear, E. P. (2005). ‘Entrepreneurship’. Journal of Labor Economics, 23 (4): 649-80. 21 
Levie, J., and E. Autio (2008). ‘A Theoretical Grounding and Test of the GEM Model’. 
Small Business Economics, 31 (3): 235-63. 
Leibenstein, H. (1968). ‘Entrepreneurship and Development’. American Economic 
Review, 58 (2): 72-83. 
Leibenstein, H. (1978). General X-efficiency Theory and Economic Development. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Leibenstein, H. (1995). ‘The Supply of Entrepreneurship’. In G. M. Meier (ed.), 
Leading Issues in Economic Development. New York: Oxford University Press, 
273-5. 
Li, W. (2002). ‘Entrepreneurship and Government Subsidies: A General Equilibrium 
Analysis’. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 26 (11): 1815-44. 
Lucas, R. E. (1978). ‘On the Size Distribution of Firms’. Bell Journal of Economics, 9 
(2): 508-23.  
Manolova, T. S., R. V. Eunni, and B. S. Gyoshev (2008). ‘Institutional Environments 
for Entrepreneurship: Evidence from Emerging Economies in Eastern Europe’. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 32 (1): 203-18. 
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Parker, S. (2007) ‘Policy-makers Beware!’. In D. Audretsch, I. Grilo and R. Thurik 
(eds), The Handbook of Entrepreneurship Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 54-63. 
Reynolds, P. D., M. Hay, and S. M. Camp (1999). ‘Global Entrepreneurship Monitor’. 
Kansas City: Kauffman Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership. 
Reynolds, P., N. Bosma, E. Autio, S. Hunt, N. De Bono, I. Servais, P. Lopez-Garcia, 
and N. Chin (2005). ‘Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: Data Collection Design and 
Implementation 1998-2003’. Small Business Economics, 24 (3): 205-31.  
Schumpeter, J. A. (1934). The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into 
Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest and the Business Cycle. Translated from the second 
edition by R. Opie. Harvard: Harvard University Press. 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1950). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper 
and Row. 
Sobel, R. S. (2008). ‘Testing Baumol: Institutional Quality and the Productivity of 
Entrepreneurship’. Journal of Business Venturing, 23 (6): 641-55. 
Sobel, R. S., J. R. Clark, and D. R. Lee (2007). ‘Freedom, Barriers to Entry, 
Entrepreneurship, and Economic Progress’. Review of Austrian Economics, 20: 
221-36. 
Stevenson, L., and A. Lundström (2005). ‘Entrepreneurship Policy for the Future: Best 
Practice Components’. In R. van der Horst, S. King-Kauanui and S. Duffy (eds), 
Keystones of Entrepreneurship Knowledge. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 177-94. 
Stevenson, L., and A. Lundström (2007). ‘Dressing the Emperor: The Fabric of 
Entrepreneurship Policy’. In D. Audretsch, I. Grilo and R. Thurik (eds), The 
Handbook of Entrepreneurship Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 94-129. 22 
Storey, D. (2005). ‘Entrepreneurship, Small and Medium Sized Enterprises and Public 
Policies’. In Z. J. Acs and D. Audretsch (eds), Handbook of Entrepreneurship 
Research: An Interdisciplinary Survey and Introduction. New York: Springer, 
473-511. 
Timmons, J. A., and S. Spinelli (2007). New Venture Creation: Entrepreneurship for 
the 21st Century, 7th Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
Thurow, L. (2003). Fortune Favours the Bold: What We Must Do to Build a New and 
Lasting Global Prosperity. New York: Harper Collins. 
Wennekers, S., and R. Thurik (1999). ‘Linking Entrepreneurship and Economic 
Growth’. Small Business Economics, 13 (1): 27-55. 
Wennekers, S., A. van Stel, R. Thurik, and P. Reynolds (2005). ‘Nascent 
Entrepreneurship and the Level of Economic Development’. Small Business 
Economics, 24 (3): 293-309. 
West, G. P., C. E. Bamford, and J. W. Marsden (2008). ‘Contrasting Entrepreneurial 
Economic Development in Emerging Latin American Economies: Applications and 
Extensions of Resource-Based Theory’. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 32 
(1): 15-36. 
Wong, P. K., Y. P. Ho, and E. Autio (2005). ‘Entrepreneurship, Innovation and 
Economic Growth: Evidence from GEM Data’. Small Business Economics, 24 (3): 
335-50. 
van Stel, A., M. Carree, and R. Thurik (2005). ‘The Effect of Entrepreneurial Activity 
on National Economic Growth’. Small Business Economics, 24 (3): 311-21.  
Verheul, I., S. Wennekers, D. B. Audretsch, and R. Thurik (2002). ‘An Eclectic Theory 
of Entrepreneurship’. In D. B. Audretsch, R. Thurik, I. Verheul and S. Wennekers 
(eds), Entrepreneurship: Determinants and Policy in a European–US Comparison. 
Boston/Dordrecht: Kluwer Academia Publishers, 11-81. 
Virgill, N. (2008). ‘Export Processing Zones: Tools of Development or Reform 
Delay?’. Fairfax: School of Public Policy, George Mason University. PhD 
Dissertation. 
Zacharakis, A. L., W. D. Bygrave, and D. A. Shepherd (2000). Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor: National Entrepreneurship Assessment: United States of America. Kansas 
City: Kauffman Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership. 23 


































































  High-income countries    Low-middle income countries 
                    
1 Australia                    32 Argentina                   
2 Austria                 33 Brazil                   
3 Belgium                      34 Chile                  
4 Canada                    35 China                  
5 Czech Republic             36 Colombia             
6 Denmark                      37 Croatia                   
7 Finland                      38 Dominican Rep.            
8 France                      39 Ecuador            
9 Germany                    40 Hungary                  
10 Greece                     41 India               
11 Hong Kong SAR                   42 Indonesia            
12 Iceland                      43 Jamaica              
13 Ireland                      44 Jordan            
14 Israel                  45 Kazakhstan           
15 Italy                      46 Latvia               
16 Japan                      47 Malaysia            
17 Korea            48 Mexico                
18 Netherlands                      49 Peru                
19 New Zealand                   50 Philippines            
20 Norway                      51 Poland             
21 Portugal                 52 Romania           
22 Puerto Rico                53 Russia               
23 Singapore                    54 Serbia           
24 Slovenia                      55 South Africa                  
25 Spain                      56 Thailand                 
26 Sweden                      57 Turkey             
27 Switzerland                    58 Uganda             
28 Taiwan             59 Uruguay             
29 United Arab Emirates                  60 Venezuela                
30 United Kingdom                                
31 United States                                
Note:    = Country participating. 
Source:  Compiled by the author, based on GEM annual reports. 